Deciding with long-term environmental impacts: what role for discounting? by Schilizzi, Steven
  1 
The 47
th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 
Fremantle, Western Australia, 12-14 February 2003 
 
 
Deciding with long-term environmental impacts:  




‘Modelling inter-temporal concern is [yet] to be transformed from an art to a science’.  
Jack Pezzey, 1997 
 
In  politics  we  have  so  firm  a  faith  in  the  manifestly  unknowable  future  that  we  are 
prepared to sacrifice millions of lives to an opium smoker’s dream of Utopia or world 
dominion or perpetual security. But where natural resources are concerned, we sacrifice 
a pretty accurately predictable future to present greed. We know, for example, that if we 
abuse the soil it will lose its fertility; that if we massacre the forests our children will lack 
timber  and  see  their  uplands  eroded,  their  valleys  swept  by  floods.  Nevertheless,  we 
continue to abuse the soil and massacre the forests. In a word, we immolate the present 
to the future in those complex human affairs where foresight is impossible; but in the 
relatively simple affairs of nature, where we know quite well what is likely to happen, we 
immolate the future to the present.  
 
Aldous HUXLEY, 1945 




The problem of how to discount values in the far future is reviewed, and shown to lead 
down a blind alley. An alternative is proposed that allows long term consequences to be 
addressed  by  decisions  using  a  relatively  short  term  time  horizon.  A  simple  model 
investigating the optimal containment of radioactive waste in a deterministic world is 
used to show that current generations can indeed cater for the interests of the far future 
while optimising over the short term; however, this is not always possible. The proposed 
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Foreword 
This  paper  has  its  origins  in  a  presentation  given  at  the  2001  AARES
2  Pre-
Conference Workshop in Adelaide (South Australia), organised by David Pannell and 
myself, on ‘Discounting in Theory and Practice’
3, the title of which was ‘Long Term 
Discounting: Why So Many Voices and So Little Consensus?’
4  
 
1. Introduction  
The nature of the problem is well known. Over the very long term, spanning 
centuries  and  many  generations,  the  use  of  a  constant  positive  discount  rate  reduces 
future values, however large, to next to nothing. For instance, with a standard discount 
rate of 7%, any rational individual should only be willing to pay $1.70 for avoiding the 
destruction of all the world’s wealth in 200 years. The source of the problem is also well 
known: the power of exponential compounding, which reflects the common assumption 
of a constant rate of unlimited economic growth. However, the problem has received 
many different and often conflicting ‘solutions’, with some authors claiming it has no 
solution - at least , no rational solution!   
Three  paradigmatic  examples  that  epitomise  the  issue  are  habitat  destruction 
leading to species extinctions, global warming, and radioactive nuclear waste disposal. 
They all involve long time frames, respectively decades, centuries, and millennia - the 
half-life of plutonium-based radioactive waste spanning over 24,000 years. In each case, 
when protective measures are envisaged, short term benefits are balanced against (very) 
long term costs, most of which, though difficult to quantify, are thought to be ‘potentially 
huge’.  
Any discussion involving the (very) long term begs the question: how long is the 
(very) long term? Three criteria at least have been offered, all of which result, perhaps 
not by coincidence, in the same approximate number. These are time frames  
1) greater than the average distance between two generations,  
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2)  greater than the longest term for government treasury bonds,  
3)  those for which there exist no market mechanisms for intertemporal trading.  
All three criteria result in a threshold time frame of around 30 years. Anything beyond 
that time horizon appears as the ‘very long term’. Let us refer to it as T.  
The  purpose  of  this  contribution  is  to  try  to  find  a  way  around  the  lack  of 
consensus over the issue of ‘long term discounting’, with the aim to help clear the way 
for ‘modelling inter-temporal concern if is to be transformed from an art to a science’ 
(Pezzey, 1997: p. 464). The book edited by Portney and Weyant in 1999, ‘Discounting 
and  Intergenerational  Equity’,  exemplifies  the  lack  of  consensus  among  leading 
economists, and has been taken as a landmark reference for this contribution. The aim 
here is first to clarify the setting within which the problem is posed, and then suggest a 
framework for further progress towards resolving the problem.  
The analysis is practically oriented, in that it addresses the concerns of a (public) 
decision-maker. We also take a step back from the question “how to value (very) long 
term consequences”, which presumes the need for such a valuation, and ask, rather, “how 
can we make decisions that take into account (very) long term consequences?” At this 
stage, although they are by no means excluded, we avoid theoretical discussions of inter-
temporal social welfare and criteria of sustainability. In other words, we start from the 
practical user-oriented question of ‘how do we make decisions when (very) long term 
consequences are at stake’ and work backwards towards justifications of one’s choice.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the responses 
offered to the long term discounting problem. Section 3 proposes an alternative approach 
to discounting the long term. Section 4 presents a simple model of radioactive waste 
containment and discusses the main results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The long term discounting problem 
 
Conventionally, the long term discounting (LTD) problem is defined as the rate at 
which values beyond the long term time threshold, T, however determined, are to be 
compared to values today. In practice, this means values at least 30 years into the future, 
and typically very much further.    4 
 
2.1 The three long term discounting approaches 
The literature shows there are three possible responses to the LTD problem. These 
are, in their pure form: 
·  No discounting or zero discounting of (very) long term impacts. 
·  Use of a single constant positive discount rate. 
·  Use of a declining sequence of positive discount rates. 
The last category subdivides as follows 
5:  
￿  Use of two discount rates, a short term and a long term one. 
￿  Use of more than two rates, in declining order 
￿  Use of a non-constant declining discount rate as a function of time. (This case 
corresponds to an infinite number of declining discount rates.)  
Hyperbolic discounting is a typical example of the last category.  
There are also hybrid responses, such as the Chichilnisky criterion (1996, and 
Åsheim, 1996), which is a weighted average between a constantly discounted and a non-
discounted term for future values.  
The no- or zero-discounting response may be seen as two variants of the same 
option. However, they are not theoretically equivalent, even if they are so in practice. No 
discounting reflects a refusal of the principle of discounting for the long term, whereas 
zero-discounting accepts this principle but argues that the LT discount rate should be 
zero. The refusal variant is generally made on ethical grounds. Environmental activists or 
ideologists  have  often  adopted  this  position,  but  Thomas  Schelling  (1995,  1999),  an 
economist, also argues for this solution. Zero discounting, if chosen, must however be 
justified on economic grounds. Both rationales will be examined further below.  
The single (positive) discount rate response expresses the fact that both the short 
term  and  the  long  term,  that  is,  values  before  and  after  the  threshold  T,  must  be 
discounted  in  a similar  manner.  This  is  the standard  exponential  discounting  used  in 
finance, but also in optimal growth theory, and more generally by mainstream economists 
working within the so-called neo-classical paradigm.  
                                                 
5 This categorisation is simplified on practical grounds. An elaboration is offered in Appendix 1.    5 
The  multiple  discount  rate  response  is  a  more  recent  idea,  although  Ainslie’s 
challenge to (single rate) exponential discounting dates back to 1975. The number n of 
discount rates can be directly related to the number n-1 of time thresholds Ti, iÎ[1, n-1]. 
Thus the use of two rates, a higher and a lower one, imply a single time threshold. A 
different  use  of  the  idea  is  found,  implicitly,  in  Fisher  and  Krutilla  (1975),  where 
technological decay and increased scarcity of natural resources can be interpreted as two 
different discount rates over the same time horizon.  
If n rates are used, they appear in decreasing order, with lower rates used further 
into the future. The use of a decreasing, rather than increasing sequence is based on 
empirical knowledge: people have been systematically observed to discount far future 
values less than near future values (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, 1993)
6. In the limit, as 
the number of time thresholds and corresponding discount rates increase to infinity, one 
obtains  a  continuously  declining  discount  rate  function.  Hyperbolic  discounting  is  a 
typical example. An example of a discrete sequence of (five) declining discount rates is 
given by Weitzman (1998, 2001). However, this sequence is underlain by a continuous 
gamma  distribution,  leading  Weitzman  (2001)  to  call  it  ‘gamma  discounting’.  The 
reasons underpinning the use of multiple declining discount rates are several, and will be 
examined later on.  
Given the three – explicit or implicit – discounting possibilities, how are we to 
choose? As it turns out, each holds surprises of its own.  
1)  Not discounting or zero-discounting the long term leads to problems of short-term 
(t<T) inefficiency. This is because the computed value of investments is distorted 
towards  benefits  arising  after  T,  and  there  results  under-investment  in  projects 
yielding benefits before T (where typically T » 30 years).  
2)  The  use  of  a  single  constant  discount  rate  seems  to  lead  to  problems  of 
intergenerational equity (IG-equity). If too high, future generations may be sacrificed; 
if  too  low,  the  current  generation  may  be  sacrificed  (see  Huxley’s  quote).  This 
suggests the existence of an (unique) ‘optimal’ value of the discount rate, which is 
indeed the solution to an (unique) intertemporal optimisation problem. This however 
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raises questions of what function is to be optimised over generations, and, through the 
choice of an intertemporal social welfare function, reintroduces ethics and subjective, 
if not arbitrary, choices.  
3)  The use of a declining sequence of discount rates seems to lead to problems of time 
inconsistency: decisions which are optimal from today’s perspective are no longer 
optimal  from  tomorrow’s  perspective,  even  if  nothing  new  happens  (no  new 
information). Strotz (1955/56) qualified this phenomenon as a form of myopia.  
Two issues are at stake here:  
- the relative role of efficiency and equity concerns; 
- time inconsistency.  
The first issue runs much deeper than the second. At first sight, it seems that the 
long term discounting problem can be said to stem from a conflict between criteria of 
(intertemporal) efficiency and (intergenerational) equity. This is indeed a problem, as 
discounting is a tool for achieving economic efficiency, not equity. If equity is a concern, 
how then can it be catered for?   
 
2.2 Efficiency vs. equity: lower the discount rate, somehow!   
The literature offers a number of strategies that have been adopted to address the 
problem of intergenerational equity over the long term. However, all share a common 
feature: they involve lowering the discount rate somehow. Unfortunately for a unified 
understanding of the issue, the rationales for doing so vary widely. Let us briefly review 
them.  
 
a)  Set pure time preference equal to zero  
One strategy, in public decision making, is to start with Ramsey’s well-known 
equation,  
(1)   r = d + eg            
where r is the social rate of discount, or the social rate of time preference (SRTP), d is the 
pure rate of time preference (PRTP), or utility discount rate, e is the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption or income (depending on the numeraire used), and g is the annual   7 
growth  rate  of consumption or  income,  that  is, the  growth  rate  of  the  economy
7.  As 
Ramsey himself argued in 1928, d can, and should, be set to zero on ethical grounds. 
Although individuals may show impatience for personal consumption, society as a whole 
may  not.  This  is  a  normative,  rather  than  a  descriptive,  stance.  It  implicitly  gives 
individuals of future generations the same weight as individuals today.  
  Besides being normative, this approach focuses on society’s consumption stream, 
rather than on its production capacity. In a perfect market with complete futures, both 
aspects would equate: the rate at which the value of future consumption declines, and the 
rate of return on current investments. However, such is not the case. Thus the question 
remains as to which aspect should be given precedence, consumption or production.  
 
b)  Consider the possibility of future negative growth  
The elasticity factor (e) in equation (1) above is an empirically observed quantity, 
varying mostly between 0.5 and 1.5, and often taken to be equal to 1 (which implies a 
logarithmic utility function, which was Bernouilli’s (1738) initial proposal). The only 
other solution left for lowering r is to have a pessimistic view of g. After all, annual 
growth rates can be, and have been, negative. However, over long periods of time, it has 
been positive,  and  typically  ranges from  1  to  3% in  real  terms.  One  is  left  with  the 
question of over what period of time g should be averaged, as well as over what scale g 
should be measured: sectoral, national, or global? The above figures represent the 200 
years following the industrial revolution (1800-2000); who is to say that they will be 
valid for the next 200 years?  
 
c) Offset discounting by increasing future costs 
A related approach is to consider, as Fisher and Krutilla did as early as 1975, that 
costs  associated  with  an  investment  will  increase  over  time.  In  environmental 
applications,  this  could  represent  increased  natural  resource  scarcity,  such  as  the 
disappearance of  wilderness areas. Thus the burden put on  future  generations by our 
current discounting of future impacts, both benefits and costs, are offset by increasing 
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future scarcity costs. Note that this is absolute scarcity. Discounting is further offset by a 
technological  factor,  which  reflects  the  increasing  obsolescence  of  current  manmade 
assets. As and Pearce and Turner (1990: chapter 20) point out, this double whammy on 
discounting  can  be  reinterpreted  as  the  use  of  two  different  discount  rates:  one, 
augmented, for development projects, and one, reduced, for nature conservation projects. 
However, this approach targets relatively small publicly funded investment projects that 
do not alter the economy as a whole, a point made by Quiggin (1993, 1997).  
 
d)  Use a declining discount rate function  
Yet  another  strategy  to  lower  the  discount  rate  for  the  far  future  is  to  use  a 
declining discount rate function. Typically, a hyperbolic function has been used, mainly 
on grounds of observed behaviour (e.g. Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). They observed that 
decision makers account for both the absolute and the relative timing of events, that is, 
the duration between two events and their timing with respect to the present. The problem 
here is the normative status of this descriptive human behaviour, as well as that of time 
inconsistency  (Page,  1977)  and  its  effects  on  project  appraisal  (Cropper  &  Laibson, 
1999).  There  is  also  some  debate  as  to  whether  behaviour  in  non-market  laboratory 
conditions is a valid reproduction of the market-sanctioned decisions we make in real-
world environments.  
Recently,  empirically  observed  hyperbolic  discounting  has  been  given  an 
alternative  explanation  (Read,  2001;  Frederick  et  al.,  2002),  that  of  ‘sub-additive 
discounting’. The fall of the discount rate over time then appears as an illusion produced 
by  the  product  of  two  factors:  the  interval-density  effect,  and  the  zero-time  interval 
origin. The first factor describes the extent to which a time interval (T, T’) is partitioned 
into sub-intervals (T, T1, T2, …,Tn, T’). Read (2001) showed that the total amount of 
discounting over (T, T’) increases with n, even though (T, T’) remained unchanged. The 
second factor refers to the fact that in practice we discount from the present, that is, over 
the interval (0, T’). Thus, as T’ recedes into the future, the (implicit partitioning) of (0, 
T’)  becomes  increasingly  ‘coarser’,  leading  to  an  apparently  falling  discount  rate.   9 
Although the end effect is a hyperbolic function, the underlying explanation is different 
from the usual one that relies on absolute and relative positions of T and T’
8.     
 
e)  Account for uncertain future discount rates 
Weitzman’s  (1998)  idea,  which  he  later  presented  under  a  different  angle 
(Weitzman, 2001) and which has recently been advocated by Resources for the Future 
(Newell & Pizer, 2001), uses yet another strategy to lower the discount rate for long-term 
consequences. His idea is best illustrated in reference to the Ramsey formula, although 
reference to this formula is not necessary.  It is based on the following mathematical 
insight. Suppose several growth rates are possible in the future (g in equation 1), and 
therefore several discount rates are also possible. Suppose for simplicity that each rate is 
equally likely (uniform probability distribution). Then it turns out that, the further you 
compute into the future, the quicker the higher discount rates discount themselves away. 
Far enough into the future, you may as well use the lowest of the possible discount rates: 
it will be the only one ‘surviving’ its self-erosion effect. The effect typically becomes 
noteworthy 200 time units into the future (years if annual discount rates are used).  
The  outcome  of  this  approach  is  a  declining  sequence  of  discount  rates  as  a 
function of time – that is, the further one computes (today) into the future, the lower the 
discount rate one must use. Weitzman (1998, 2001), by considering only integer-valued 
rates, defines five time horizons and, correspondingly, five discount rates. Beyond 300 
years, it is zero.  
This is a very neat idea, and one that does the job pretty well. The problem with it 
is that it is hard to relate it to any concept of equity, intergenerational or otherwise. It is 
purely a consequence of our ignorance of the future. Now, it may be that there is some 
intrinsic link between attitudes to uncertainty and attitudes towards time as well as (intra- 
or inter-generational) equity, as some recent work seems to suggest
9, but no such link is 
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implied by Weitzman’s idea
10. So if we are happy to use this approach to reduce the 
discount rate for the far future, we can do so, but not on the grounds of intergenerational 
equity. In other words, we are not addressing our concerns for future generations. The 
fact that the result happens to favour them is a mathematical fluke. This may be seen as 
hardly satisfactory.  
More importantly, since the choice of the long-term discount rate is extremely 
sensitive to the lowest possible rate, how are we to identify this lowest rate? If it is by 
using past data (e.g. on treasury bonds), how are we to choose the period of time over 
which to define a lowest rate? Note too that Weitzman’s model does not accommodate a 
negative lowest rate – a not inconceivable case with prolonged negative growth
11.  
 
From the review above, the conclusion that seems we should draw is that, however we 
decide to deal with very long term consequences, it would be wise to clearly distinguish 
efficiency  concerns  from  (intergenerational)  equity  concerns.  This  would  allow,  as  is 
customary in economics, to use the full-efficiency, no-equity solution as a benchmark, 
relative to which one can measure the degree of equity one is willing to show. This is 
what Schelling (1995, 1999) forcefully recommended. For all practical purposes, it is 
useful  to  define  as  ‘purely  economic’  decisions  those  that  only  consider  costs  and 
benefits, however determined, to the decision maker’s own interests or utility function. 
This does not necessarily exclude altruism, if the decision maker happens to derive utility 
from others’ welfare; however, considerations of altruistic utility functions needlessly 
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2.3 Discounting, pure time preference, and time inconsistency  
The second issue is that of time inconsistency. If the discount rate is non-constant 
over time, decisions become inconsistent in the sense that they will be reversed at some 
point in the future, and the decision maker will make the decision today knowing she will 
reverse it later on, even in a perfectly foreseeable world. As Solow (1999) puts it, ‘this is 
a poor way to run a railroad’. However, this is not the end of the story. 
In the above discussion over how the discount rate behaves over time, reference 
was implicitly made to the ‘social rate of time preference’, as defined for example in the 
Ramsey formula. It is a quantity that combines both the rate of pure time preference 
(RPTP),  or  utility  discount  rate,  and  a  rate  depending  on  the  productivity  of  capital, 
linked to the average market interest rate. Although not clearly spelled out, basically all 
of the empirical literature on hyperbolic discounting deals with the RPTP of individuals 
concerned with their own private utility function. Experiments typically involve trade-
offs over time of two fixed quantities, whether of money or otherwise: a smaller quantity 
sooner versus a larger quantity later, all else being held constant: the individual’s wealth, 
the productivity of her assets, and the state of the economy.  In other words, the capital 
growth  or  productivity  component  of  the total discount  rate  is  held  constant  and  not 
accounted  for.  The  conclusion  is  that  hyperbolic  discounting,  however  interpreted, 
applies only to the RPTP or utility discount rate. It does not apply, at least not on the 
grounds of this empirical literature, to any social discount rate. And in particular, it is 
difficult to see in it any justification for its normative use for public decision making.  
 This should come as no surprise to anyone who has read the original paper that 
Paul Samuelson wrote in 1937. This is where the concept of a constant utility discount 
rate was first proposed, leading to the conventional use of the exponential utility discount 
function. Although, perhaps due to its mathematical elegance, economists took up this 
proposal and have run with it ever since, Samuelson took great pains in that paper to 
warn against any normative or descriptive interpretation of his formulation,  stressing the 
fact that it was absolutely arbitrary and that ‘there is no reason why people should behave 
in  this  way’.  As  a  result,  we  should  be  happy  to  adopt,  from  now  on,  a  hyperbolic 
function  for  utility  discounting.  Any  constant  ‘rate  of  pure  time  preference’  can  be   12 
dismissed as an irrelevant parameter. Note that Samuelson was very clear that he was 
dealing with utility discounting, not consumption or income discounting.  
This  helps  us  clarify  the  issue  of  time  inconsistency.  If  utility  discounting  is 
hyperbolic, how do we deal with the fact that it leads to time inconsistent decisions? But 
this is forgetting that utility is utility of something, whether of income, consumption, or 
otherwise; strictly, consideration of future utility cannot be made independently of some 
economic state variable. In a remarkable paper, Pezzey (2002) manages to dispel the 
confusion by showing that when the discount factor (not rate) is made to depend not only 
on time itself, but also on some economic state variable st at time t, time inconsistency 
disappears.  Its existence is due to the fact that the instantaneous discount rate is not 
reoptimised  at  every  t  as  a  function  of  st.  Thus,  if  future  utility  is  discounted 
hyperbolically, the resulting value of future income, consumption or returns on capital 
can also be discounted hyperbolically, provided that the discount factor at time t is made 
to depend on the state of the economy, and therefore on absolute time (the historical 
date). This is compatible with Read’s origin-fixed interval interpretation of sub-additive 
discounting on (0, T). However, there is no reason why the state-dependent part of the 
discounting function should behave hyperbolically; indeed, given its dependence on the 
real rate of growth, it is logical that it behaves exponentially with a fixed growth discount 
rate. As a result, the combination of hyperbolic time preference and exponential income 
or consumption discounting could take on a complex form.  
The last consideration, of course, is that time preference itself depends on some 
economic state variable, namely some  measure  of wealth. In their paper, Becker  and 
Mulligan (1997) explore such a possibility.  
The above discussion on time preference mainly refers to individual or private 
decision  making.  In  matters  of  public  decision  making,  consideration  of  pure  time 
preference, which is simply a measure of impatience, is rather controversial. Ramsey, in 
his  path-breaking  paper  (1928),  dismissed  it  as  unethical.  The  question,  though,  is 
whether we are interested in its descriptive or normative use for decision making. My 
view is that if we are trying to explain, ex post, how public decisions are or have been 
made, then we must consider a descriptive approach to time preference, and work out 
whether government agencies or other public decision makers reveal some positive pure   13 
time preference or not. However, especially considering how imperfect, if not corrupt, 
many government decisions are, it is the normative approach that should be used when 
we  are  interested  in  recommending,  ex  ante,  a  decision  with  community-wide 
implications. Unless we have a model of endogenous time preference, we must follow 
Ramsey’s advice (and many others’ since) that the only justifiable choice is zero time 
preference. In this case, whether time preference is hyperbolic or not becomes irrelevant. 
If government, on the one hand, represents the interests of the whole community and, on 
the  other  hand,  can  and  should  supersede  ‘myopic’  private  preferences,  then  it  must 
impose its own (absence of) time preference.     
 
2.4 Capital markets, discounting, and the long term future  
 
If  we  accept  for  now  that  public  decision  making  should  neglect  pure  time 
preference and focus on the values underlying the utility function, the question becomes 
to what extent can capital markets, which determine the marginal productivity of capital 
and the return on investments, deal with long term consequences? From the decision 
maker’s point of view, whatever her concerns for the far future, will she be able to afford 
her concerns given the constraints imposed by the cost of capital?  This is especially 
relevant as most of the capital for long term investments is borrowed on the financial 
market.  
In essence, capital or financial markets are institutions for trading values over 
time (with an essential component of risk trading as well). In practice, values cannot be 
traded over very long periods of time, like centuries. Capital markets have de facto a time 
horizon, of the order of about 30 years. There is little, if any, willingness to trade values 
over  a  longer  time  period,  although  some  forms  of  investment  (superannuation,  life 
insurance, in-family intergenerational lending) can exceed this time; however, there are 
no proper ‘markets’ that trade such values. As a result, beyond the market’s time horizon, 
there are no prices of capital. At first sight, markets cannot cater for the very long term.  
A)  On  closer  inspection,  however,  this  view  rests  with  how  efficient  capital 
markets are deemed to be. If they are perfectly efficient, then each generation will be 
able,  in  a  perfectly  overlapping  generations  model,  to  trade  values  with  the  next   14 
generation, and so on into the future. Individuals behave as if the were infinitely lived 
and  as  if  they  were  maximising  their  benefits  over  an  infinite  time  horizon.  This  is 
essentially  the  approach  adopted  by  the  neo-classical  optimal  growth  literature. 
Compensation between earlier and later generations happens gradually and automatically, 
and welfare or utility can remain non-decreasing over time.  
Of course, such a view presumes perfect micro-macro coordination at all scales, 
and that all assets, whatever their nature, can be traded in capital markets. This also 
implies perfect substitutability between tradable assets. As well we know, such a view is 
overly  optimistic,  especially  when  natural  resources  and  environmental  assets  are  at 
stake
13.  
B) The opposite view states that the existence of non-substitutable or non-tradable 
assets, such as most environmental values, creates a time barrier for capital markets (the 
economic time horizon), in which case they are totally incapable of catering for the long 
term.  The  only  way  to  do  so  is  to  use  ethical  motives  and  show  concern  for  future 
generations. However, this also means a willingness to pay for the far future that will in 
any event be limited by the current income stream, both private and public. It is easy to 
understand why proponents of this view advocate strong governmental action to force 
private interests into catering for the long term. But they run against the possibility that 
government failure be at least as bad as market failure, if not worse.  
In  an  ingenious  paper,  Ari  Rabl  (1996)  proposes  notwithstanding  a  two-stage 
‘inter-generational’ discounting method that can handle the absolute time barrier. This 
amounts to using two discount rates, a higher short term one and a close-to-zero long 
term one  (beyond the 30 year time horizon). He applies his  method to nuclear plant 
construction  and  radioactive  waste  disposal  (Rabl,  1999).  His  idea  is  based  on 
compensating future generations with the extra capital build-up (or economic growth) 
that such investments will have made possible. Philibert (1998), in a review article, points 
out that this ‘impossible’ intergenerational compensation, based on such a mechanism, 
runs  into  problems  of  time  inconsistency  at  T=30  as  well  as  future  continuation  of 
growth. Rabl’s paper is still a valuation exercise in long term cost benefit analysis.  
                                                 
13 The efforts put into environmental valuation and into creating tradable property rights will help, jointly, 
to bring about a state of affairs tending, however imperfectly, towards this ideal situation.    15 
C)  There  is  of  course  a  middle  view,  whereby  capital  markets  are  seen  as 
imperfectly  efficient,  with  the  tradability  of  assets  linked  to  their  degree  of 
substitutability and to the irreversibility of their possible future loss. These characteristics 
are  closely  related  to  the  assumptions  one  makes  over  the  possibilities  of  technical 
progress, which, in terms of endogenous technological change, must depend both on the 
incentives to generate R&D and on the  economic efficiency of R&D.  Thus the key 
variable becomes the willingness to invest in those types of investments that can offset in 
some way the losses imposed on future generations. This offsetting must however deal 
with the severity of the so-called ‘commitment problem’, where generation 2 can step in 
and destroy (or consume) what generation 1 invested for generations 3, 4, and beyond. 
What is needed is an irreversible investment that intermediate generations cannot undo. 
There is only  one  form  of investment  that stands up  to the  challenge:  investment  in 
knowledge and R&D. To the extent that the knowledge produced has any value, and that 
it is governed by increasing returns to scale, it will, as discussed below, be safeguarded 
and available for the future.   
 
3. An alternative to the long term discounting approach  
 
3.1 Introducing the idea: investments with irreversible benefits  
Let’s face it: the long term valuation problem is an intractable one. At least, it has 
been so far. This suggests the idea that if we cannot base long term decisions on long 
term valuations, we need to base them on something else. In other words, we need to seek 
a way around the long term discounting problem and avoid it altogether, albeit in a way 
that allows for the opportunity costs of investments.  
Compounding this, Schelling (1995, 1999) makes the point that costs and benefits 
to  future  generations  are  akin  to  costs  and  benefits  to  ‘foreigners’  in  programs  of 
international aid, and therefore the issue is purely one of equity, be it intra- or inter-
generational. As discounting is a tool for maximising efficiency, discounting has no place 
in the valuation of long term consequences. I find Schelling’s argument compelling. As 
stated earlier, it is wise for clarity’s sake to keep efficiency and equity concerns clearly 
separate. If long term decisions cannot be based on long term valuations and yet depend   16 
on some type of (perhaps implicit) valuation, the only solution left is perhaps a startling 
one: they must be based on short term valuations!  
This  amounts  to  asking  how  a  decision  maker  with  no  ethical  or  altruistic 
concerns for future generations can nevertheless cater for their welfare while making his 
decisions within his own time horizon, and with presumably positive discounting. Can 
medium term (< 30 years) decisions handle long term costs and benefits without the need 
to value these costs and benefits? More, can the decision maker optimise within his own 
limited economic decision making framework as if he were optimising over the very long 
term? And if not, can he be led in a short enough time to do so in a way that is beneficial 
to him and today’s society?  
The only way this can be possible is to use the R&D investment idea suggested 
earlier (section 2.4,C), and invest in specifically targeted cost mitigating R&D effort. The 
importance of this control variable lies in the irreversibility of its benefits. If its benefits 
were to decline in the future, it must be that other knowledge and other technologies have 
superseded its value, but thereby reducing future costs even further. (Knowledge, know-
how and technical progress lead to further knowledge, know-how and technical progress, 
continually modifying the relative value of existing technologies.)  
This notion of investments with irreversible benefits is different from Arrow’s 
discussion of  irreversible  investments  (Arrow,  1999).  Arrow,  rather  quickly  it  seems, 
dismisses  the  idea  of  irreversible  investments  on  the  grounds  of  the  commitment 
problem. This is when there is no guarantee that the next generation, or some other after 
it,  will  continue  to  invest  at  the  same  rate  as  the  current  one.  But  with  irreversible 
benefits, and with otherwise  increasing  future  costs,  every  successive  generation  will 
have  an  incentive  to  continue  investing  in  irreversible  benefits,  simply  because,  as 
discussed below, it will itself benefit both directly and indirectly. Does it look like we are 
about  to  reduce  our  R&D  efforts  towards  mitigating  the  possible  effects  of  climate 
change?  The  only  reason  why  such  an  effort  might  decline  in  the  future  would  be 
because, for one reason or another, the costs of climate change would start decreasing. 
Arrow’s argument does not address this aspect, and his reference to ‘elementary theory’ 
might explain why. Holmes might in this case refrain from answering Watson’s questions 
in the usual manner!    17 
It also matters that such R&D investments be specifically targeted at reducing the 
specific costs that will weigh on future generations. If radioactivity is the future risk, then 
R&D targeted at reducing the impacts of radioactivity on living organisms is such an 
investment.  (This  would  entail  fundamental  research  on  the  biophysical  interactions 
between radioactivity, molecular biology and genetics.)  
The  key  point,  however,  is  that  any  such  investment  will  not  only  produce 
benefits (e.g. in the form of reduced risks) in the long term, but may also do so in the 
medium or short term, within the economic time horizon. This will happen in two ways: 
directly,  through  reduced  radioactive  risks  within  an  individual’s  own  lifetime,  and 
indirectly,  through  positive  spin-offs  creating  value  in  other  spheres  of  health  and 
environment. These two sources of benefits will add up and will constitute the ‘internal’ 
benefits of the R&D investment program. The ‘external’ benefits are those to people 
beyond the economic time horizon.  
Within this framework, the problem becomes the following: can the direct plus 
indirect inner benefits be sufficient so as to initiate a stream of (R&D) investments that 
will also offset future damages? And if so, under what conditions? How is this problem to 
be properly formulated, and can a negative answer suggest ways for overturning it?  
 
3.2 Analysis of an illustrative case: the containment of highly radioactive waste    
 
As always, the problem will be simplified and a specific case will be examined. 
The containment of a given quantity of highly radioactive waste appears as the simplest 
problem of this kind. The primary decision problem can be taken as the level of structural 
investment necessary to achieve a socially optimal level of risk from today’s point of 
view,  without  consideration  of  the  long  term  future.  This  means  optimising  the 
containment investment in terms of the risks faced by the current generation (all those 
already born, or at least conceived). In practice, this sets the time limit for the accounting 
of costs and benefits at about 100 years, which spans 3 to 4 generations (assuming very 
few people alive today will be alive then). Such an optimum from today’s generations’ 
standpoint will be suboptimal for people further into the future if, as is the case, risks   18 
increase with time due to the aging of the containment system and to other, external 
causes (land movements, earthquakes, leaks into groundwater, terrorism, etc.).  
The problem is then to find under what conditions the long term ‘external’ costs 
can  be  offset  in  a  way  that  will  yield  positive  net  ‘internal’  benefits  within  this  the 
decision maker’s economic time horizon. This implies a second decision problem and the 
use  of  an  ‘auxiliary’  control  variable,  a  stream  of  R&D  investments  in  radioactive 
damage  mitigation.  Unlike  the  primary  (structural)  investment  (S),  which  is  a  static 
control, this one is a dynamic control over time – a level of investment for each year over 
a certain  period  of time{I(t)}.  The  time  over  which  {I(t)}  will be  made  needs  to  be 
optimised.  Their  cost  is  a  function  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital,  linked  to  its 
marginal productivity in the current state of the economy. Obviously, the relative rates of 
return on capital and of increase in future risks will matter, but this increase in future 
risks  is  a  function  of  the  level  of  investments.  The  benefit  side  of  the  equation  is 
measured by the reduction in the level of risk relative to the no-investment case (I(t)=0)
14.  
R&D investments may be more or less efficient in reducing risks over time, and 
will  exhibit  decreasing  marginal  efficiency  with  respect  to  the  level  of  I(t).  This 
efficiency is of course a crucial parameter, but it depends on the efficiency with which 
the R&D effort (measured in economic terms) is itself organised. In other words, part of 
the R&D effort can be directed at increasing the efficiency with which it can mitigate 
future impacts. As a result, the extent to which an increase in I(t) reduces future risks can 
itself increase over time, as the use of knowledge becomes increasingly efficient. This is 
best modelled as a trend in time.    
Uncertainty  is  an  intrinsic  aspect  of  this  problem,  and  a  number  of  variables 
should be considered as random. However, for the time being and to keep things simple, 
we  shall  only  work  with  expected  quantities,  implying  risk  neutral  decision  makers 
throughout. This is done in order to focus on the main concepts, but it must be borne in 
mind that the consideration of uncertainty will have nontrivial consequences and is likely 
to affect whatever results a deterministic treatment may achieve.  
                                                 
14 As will be specified below, both S and I(t) reduce future radioactive risk, but in different ways. If risk is a 
function of p, the probability of an event, and of C, the damage cost of the event, then S reduces p while I(t) 
reduces C.    19 
A second simplification is that zero pure time preference is assumed throughout. 
This does not affect the essence of the problem. There are good reasons, stated earlier, 
that justify such a choice (radioactive risk is a public issue). However, a (hyperbolic) time 
preference function could easily be superimposed on the values of risks at time t.  
The two control variables S and I(t) are not on the same footing. An optimal 
stream I(t) is sought subject to a given level of investment S. However, S is optimised 
given the impact of an increased probability of an event on the current and future level of 
risks. If S is reduced (to save on up-front expenses), today’s risks will be higher and 
future risks, all else equal, will increase more rapidly (the containment system being of 
poorer quality). This could be offset by a higher stream of I(t), which would have the 
advantage of spreading the expenses over time; but today’s people would have to take 
higher risks in the meantime (R&D efforts take time to produce a noticeable effect), and 
it would take some time until risks are brought back to the level they were with the initial 
S. This said, the main problem considers S as given and seeks to offset given external 
costs using the I(t) control.  
We will now specify a simple model to investigate this problem. There are some 
technical details that pose a conceptual challenge over which we shall skip. One such 
problem is the measurement of expected risk when probabilities are very small but the 
(contingent) costs are potentially huge. In our case, the probabilities are of the order of 
10
-6 and damages of the order of $10
8. The expected value appears to be worth $100, but 
(see  Collard,  1988)  the  principles  of  conventional  expected  utility  theory  with  such 
extreme events become very controversial. Still, in this exercise we shall happily skip 
over the issue and consider the value of the risk to be simply worth $100.  
The  key  variable  that  will  determine  the  outcome  is  the  opportunity  cost  of 
capital, or the rate of return on capital,  given the state of the economy. Because the 
problem is micro-economic in nature, this rate is considered as exogenously given. In 
further  developments  it  will  be  interesting  to  make  it  endogenous  to  the  investment 
decision, for example if the externality is related to climate change. Important parameters 
are the size of the investment relative to the available capital stock (b), the value (C) of 
damages if an event happens (in this exercise a simple number, but in a more developed 
model a probability distribution across events of varying severity), the parameter function   20 
k(I) governing the cost reduction efficiency of I(t), and that (p) governing the probability 
of event reduction of an increase in S.  
The name of the  game  is to look, as a function of r  given S,  p and  k(I), for 
investment streams I(t) that yield positive net benefits within the current decision maker’s 
time horizon and which nevertheless reduce long term risks. The trick here is that the 
time horizon does have an upper bound, but is otherwise to be optimised along with the 
investment  stream.  Thus  the  optimisation  problem  is  two-dimensional  in  ({I(t)},  T), 
being understood that {I(t)} stops at t = T* (£ T), the endogenous. time horizon.   
 
4. A simple model of radioactive waste containment   
4.1 Model description 
Let  the  amount  of  radioactive  waste  Q  be  given,  for  example  at  the 
decommissioning  of  a  nuclear  plant.  This  could  be  made  up  of  plutonium  and  other 
highly radioactive material. Half-life of plutonium is about 24,000 years. Because, by 
economic standards, the decay rate is so small (less than 0.003% p.a.), the amount of 
radioactive material can be considered as constant over the first few centuries (it will 
have decreased by only 1.5% in 500 years!), a period well beyond both private and public 
decision making. This waste can be confined and stored in various ways, each having 
different degrees of safety now and in the future. The more is invested in the confinement 
system, the lower are the risks. Whatever the confinement system, two things are true: the 
probability of a radioactive mishap, p, no matter how small (say 10
-6), cannot be exactly 
zero,  and,  secondly,  this  probability  increases  over  time.  We  assume  it  does  so 
exponentially  at  a  very  slow  rate,  p  (say  1%  p.a.),  although  this  rate  is  3  orders  of 
magnitude greater than the radioactive decay rate: 
(2) 
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Let  S  be  the  structural  investment  in  the  confinement  system,  possibly  deep  under 
ground. And let So be the level of investment that is optimal for current risks today. So   21 
reflects  current  willingness  to  pay  for  today’s  safety,  regardless  of  the  future.  It 
determines the probability p that a radioactive event (accident, leak, fracture, explosion) 
could  happen  in  period  one  (this  year  or  this  day).  So  also  determines  the  rate  p  of 
increase in the probability of a mishap. An increase dS will both decrease p and p, in a 
way assumed to be in the simplest way hyperbolic: 
(3a)   p(S) = 
S
1




f   determining the value of j, 
(3b)  p(S) = 
S
1




y   determining the value of y. 
 
j and y are scaling parameters determined by the initial values, and S = S0 + dS.  
 
Investment So is drawn from a pool of initial capital, K0, leaving available for further 
investments  S K K
S - = 0 0 .   So has an opportunity cost determined by the general health 
of  the  economic  system,  which  determines  the  rate  of  return  on,  or  the  marginal 
productivity  of,  capital,  r.  In  a  perfectly  competitive  financial  market,  this  also 
corresponds to the riskless interest rate. At time t, the opportunity cost of dS can be 
written as 
(4)  ) 1 ( ) ( - = - =
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Let  {I(t)}  be  the  stream  of  R&D  based  mitigation  investments  to  reduce  the  future 
impacts of radioactive events. I(0) is the initial mitigation investment at time t=0 and I(t) 
is any future mitigation investment at time t. This investment, specifically targeted at 
reducing the impacts of future radioactive events, is made possible by diverting a portion 
of available capital stock Ks(t) at time t, which would otherwise have been reinvested in 
K(t+1). Let b be this proportion of Ks(t), such that 
 
(5)  I(t) = b.KS(t). 
   22 
b  would,  given the  orders  of  magnitude  used  here  (K0  »  $10
9),  typically  be  a small 
proportion of the available KS = K0 – S, of the order of 0.1% to 0.5%,. In this study, we 
have kept the value of b constant over time. This means that the investments will increase 
in proportion to capital build-up, and decrease with any erosion of the capital stock.     
 
The effect of such an investment is to reduce the costs of any future radioactive impact, 
whether due to damage to people or the environment, or both. Assume that without any 
such investment, costs remain unchanged; that is, if an event were to happen at time t, the 
cost of its impact, C, is a given independent of t: 
If I(t) = 0, C(t) = C = constant. 
 
A more rigorous model should of course write C as a random variable, and also, insofar 
as the valuation of damages depends on current wealth, let its value depend on K(t)
15. 
Instead, we assume for now no trend in either its mean or variance. In this model, we are 
only considering the expected values and considering them constant, measured in real 
terms. (This is not a necessary assumption, but it keeps things clearer.)  
 
We define contingent costs as the product: 
(6)  CC(t) = p(t).C 
Because p(t) is increasing over time at a rate dependent on S, CC(t) also increases at rate 
p = p(S).  
 
The damage costs at time t will, relative to no mitigation effort, be reduced by I(t) not 
only as a function of the current level of effort, but of the cumulative effort up to time t. 
This is because, if we neglect forgetfulness which today is insignificant, the benefits of 
R&D outcomes are for all practical purposes irreversible. (This avoids the commitment 
problem which plagues other long term strategies.) The effect of cumulative knowledge 
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15 We could for example allow C to grow or fall at the same rate as K(t), given K0 and C0.    23 
where k(Io) is the mitigation efficiency parameter of the mitigation effort (or investment). 
It depends on the level of investment in a way that is increasing at a decreasing rate.  
In the current version of the model, we make k depend only on the initial Io: 
(8) 
n
I I m I k k ) ln 1 ( ) ( 0 0 + = =       
where m and n are scaling parameters, and ln(x) is the natural logarithm of x.  
 
A more accurate description, to be used in a later version, makes k depend on It and on 
the flow of time itself. This second dependence represents the growth of the efficiency 
with which knowledge is put to use. It makes the cost reduction efficiency of mitigation 
effort a function of the efficiency of the use of knowledge. This knowledge efficiency is 
simply modelled as a trend in time.  The complete description is:  
(9) 
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h  is  the  R&D  efficiency  parameter  which  commands  the  time  trend  for  k(I).  
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The actual risk at time t is then defined using the above equations:  
(10)  ) ( ) ( ) ( t C t p t R =  
 
With respect to the mitigation investment effort, we are interested in how much risk is 
reduced at time t. Risk reduction dR(t) is given by: 
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This can be considered as the benefit side of the mitigation investments. The cost side is 
given by their opportunity cost Cm, which at time t is:  
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This completes the description of the model.  We are then interested basically in two 
things.  First,  given  the  initial  structural  investment  S,  what  is  the  optimal  stream  of 
mitigation investments? Secondly, if S is allowed to vary, that is, if we consider ex-ante 
the decision of how much to invest in the storage and containment of radioactive waste, 
we are interested in knowing which combination of S and {I(t)}, given r, will yield the 
maximum net benefit over a period of time?  
 
This requires the definition of net benefit. In this model, it can be defined as the net 
capital  outstanding  at  t  plus  the  surplus  value  of  cumulated  risk  reduction  over  the 
cumulated  opportunity  cost  of  the  mitigation  investments.  The  net  capital  at  t  is  the 
amount left after having each period diverted a share b of KS(t), relative to what would 
have been available with b=0; that is, if all available capital had been reinvested in the 
economy at the going interest rate (assumed constant over time).  The surplus to be added 
to this quantity is the difference, up until t, between the cumulated value of risk reduction 
(assuming an additive utility function, which is linear) and the sum total of opportunity 
costs of {I(t)}up until t.  
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This quantity is akin to that of a net present value, with the discount rate being the rate of 
return on capital, r. This r could be considered random, rather than constant, and this 
could have non-trivial effects on the results; but we shall leave this issue for later work.  
 
Model parameters have been chosen to represent plausible orders of magnitude:  
 
K0 = $1100m  
S0 =  $ 100m   
K0_S = K0 - S0 = $1000m      
p0 = 10
-6  
p = 1% per annum   25 
C =  $100m (to be interpreted as an expected value, written down in a single period) 
Scaling parameters m = n = 1, j=100, y=10
6  
 
The values of m and n determine the damage reduction efficiency of mitigation effort, 
k(I). Set both at 1, a value of I = 1 ($1 million) puts k at 0.69%, while I = 5 puts k at 
1.79%. This represents a moderately efficient scenario for mitigation investments, rather 
on the optimistic side regarding technological prospects. Setting m = 0.5 would represent 
a much more inefficient outlook. Then I = 1 would put k at 0.35% and I = 5 only at 
0.90%. Setting m = 2 would represent a very efficient R&D impact. To get a feel of how 
the model responds to these values, set r = 4% and compare I(0) = 1 ($1 million) and I(0) 
= 2. Then the results in terms of radioactive risk at a given time are as follows, with 
initial risk at 100 (Table 1):  
 
Table 1  With r = 4% and RR = risk reduction ratio (initial R = 100)  
 
m  I(0)  Risk(T=30)  RR 
 
0.5  1  110 
2    72  1.5 
1  1     90 
2    39  2.3 
2  1     60 
2    11  5.5 
 
The model was implemented using Excel®, but only some preliminary calculations have 
so far been done. Full results using this model will be presented in a later publication.  
 
 
4.2 Indicative results and discussion  
 
What follows are only some preliminary indications of qualitative significance. 
Their aim is at this early stage only to highlight the sort of outcomes one can encounter,   26 
and to suggest further questions. This is by no means a full treatment of the problem, but 
rather a specific experiment carried out for heuristic purposes.  
A first outcome of the model is that because of the nonlinearities involved, the 
risk function over time is not necessarily monotonic (see figures 1, 2, 3). For intermediate 
values of I(t), and depending on other model parameters, it may exhibit either a U shaped 
or an inverse-U shaped curve, and this may happen at all time scales, in the short as in the 
long term. Only with the lower and higher values of I(t) can risk, respectively, increase 
and fall monotonically. This result, especially for intermediate values of I(t), makes the 
problem of a ‘sustainable’ or ‘non-decreasing’ level of risk a thorny one. With (inverse) 
U-shaped curves, the peak or the trough changes in maximum height and in distance to 
the origin on the time axis. 
In the falling monotonic cases, resulting from the optimal short term investment 
schedule, all is well: the short term and long term goals are aligned. In the opposite case, 
where the optimal I*(t) produces a monotonically increasing risk curve, both current and 
future generations are in the same sinking boat. In such a case, it will be wise, if there is 
still time, to revise the structural investment S, so as to reduce, via a reduced rate of 
probability increase, the rate of increase of future risks. This action is favourable to both 
current and future generations.  
In the U-shaped and inverse U-shaped cases, two situations can happen (Table 2). 
The U can happen in the short term, before T, or later, in the long term. Both inverse U 
curves are good for the long term future. This means that the current generation, and in 
particular  the  decision  maker,  can  cater  for  the  interests  of  future  generations  while 
happily  maximising  their  net  benefits  over  their  short  time  horizon.  This  holds  even 
though values before the horizon T are discounted at the rate r.   
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Figure 1: The case of a short term inverse U-shaped curve   















Figure 2: The case of a long term inverse U shaped curve, monotonic in the short run 










Figure 3: the case of a monotonic falling risk curve 
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In the U shaped cases, a short term reduction in risk will correspond to a long 
term  increase  in  risk.  Current  and  future  generations  have  opposite  interests.  The 
optimised investment strategy is  favourable for  current  generations but not for future 
ones. The short term case (see Table 2), where risks first decline then rise before T, is not 
100% bad. It may happen that the investment strategy, though optimal, is nevertheless 
unfavourable to the present  generation: the net benefits are negative because the risk 
curve rises sharply before T, in which case there is an incentive to resort to the second 
control variable, S, by increasing the quality and security of the containment system. The 
model clearly shows, through the importance of the relative values of S and K, that we 
are dealing with a small scale problem: both I(t) and S must remain small relatively to K. 
Otherwise, the problem has macro-economic implications, with r becoming endogenous 
and total K becoming variable through, for instance, borrowing in international capital 
markets.  
The long term U case (see Table 2) is hopeless. This is a dynamic ‘trap’ against 
the  far  future.  It  is  the  only  case  where,  without  some  ethical  concern  for  future 
generations, the R&D investment strategy will not solve the problem. 
There  is  however  another  way,  which  is  to  modify  the  knowledge  efficiency 
parameter h or increase the parameter m governing the k(I) function. The first approach 
involves  the  more  efficient  use  of  knowledge;  the  second  involves  institutional  and 
technological restructuring for increasing the responsiveness of damage cost reduction to 
increases in R&D investments. Of course, such efforts would need to make economic 
sense and yield positive net benefits within the current time horizon; the problem here is 
that there is no easy way to measure such benefits, other than to run a model of this kind!  
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Table 2: Risk outcomes as a function of short term (t<T) optimisation (all potential cases) 
 
 




Monotone rising risks                         
=> Action: increase S 
GOOD or BAD, depending on dS  







LT, U-shaped curve                         U 
   = falling in the ST 
   = rising in the LT 
BAD 
LT, inverse U-shaped curve                 
   = rising in the ST 






ST, U-shaped curve                         U  
   = falling then rising in the ST 
   = rising in the LT 
BAD most of the time (dS = ?)  
ST, inverse U-shaped curve                 
   = rising then falling in the ST 
   = falling in the LT 
GOOD 
Notes:   These results only consider I(t) as a control variable, and S and r as exogenously given. 
  “Action” means using S as a second control for re-optimising I(t).   
 
The above outcomes are quite sensitive to the long term (real) rate of return on 
capital, r, which in this exercise is considered as fixed over time (a long term average). 
This parameter  also determines the optimal time horizon,  when it is shorter than the 
maximum relevant for the current generations’ cost benefit analysis. T* is defined as the 
time horizon corresponding to the maximum net benefits from I(t) investments. T* and 
I*(t) form a pair, given r. As Table 3 shows, when the given r increases, T* declines, 
maximum benefits increase, but, surprisingly, the necessary (minimum) investment I*(t) 
increases only very slightly. This is due to the built-in assumption of total reinvestment of 
non-I(t)  capital  in  further  capital  formation,  and  to  the  fact  that  r  represents  real 
productivity increase. As r increases, the rate at which capital builds up also increases.  




T*  Max 
NB(T*) 
I*(0) 
1.1%  30  276  2.6 
1.5%  26  356  2.7 
2%  22  447  2.8 
4%  15  730  3 
6%  12  965  3.1 
8%  10  1145  3.1 
 
It is noteworthy that a short T* (e.g. smaller than 30 years) does not necessarily 
exclude the possibility of catering for long term consequences; several of the above six   30 
cases are favourable, and the monotonically risk increasing case can lead to an upward 
revision of S, favourable to both current and future generations. However, the optimal 
change in S, dS*, can be such that short term risks are reduced and fall with time while 
long term risks continue to increase, albeit at a slower rate than before. Changing S can 
change the scene from a monotonically risk increasing scenario to a U shaped scenario, 
“trapping” the situation against the interests of the far future.  
Although the model can deliver much more than this, I shall stop here, as these 
general results are sufficient to answer the title question: what role for discounting in long 
term decision making?  
 
 
5. Conclusion: what role for discounting?   
 
We are now in a position to provide an answer to the title question, provided we 
specify the type of discounting. If the question is, what role for long term discounting, the 
answer is: none. If the question is, what role for short term conventional discounting, the 
answer is: a role limited to the relatively short term, as defined by the (often endogenous) 
economic time horizon. Not only is a long term discount rate questionable in principle, 
but there is no need for one. The objection will arise that we cannot then value the costs 
and benefits in the far future. The answer to this is again, not only that we should not do 
so as a matter of principle, but there is no need for such a valuation.  
It must be remembered that discounting is a means to an end, the end being the 
valuation and comparison of different values over time, and that this valuation is itself a 
means to a higher end, that of trying to decide with long term consequences. In the case 
where these consequences are negative, there needs to be the possibility of a counter-
action  to  mitigate  their  impact.  Provided  some  basic  conditions  are  met, such as  the 
irreversibility  of  mitigation  efforts  and  the  possibility  of  using  a  dynamic  control 
variable, conditions met by investments in R&D, only the valuation of consequences up 
to the economic time horizon is necessary. We have no need for valuing far future events. 
The  optimal  mitigation  effort  will  reflect  the  extent  to  which  we,  current  living 
generations, value long term consequences if, and only if, we do so for ethical reasons. It   31 
is remarkable that it is possible, even without ethical concerns for the far future
16, to cater 
for the long term while deciding only within one’s current time horizon.  
Possible, but not always. The model built to examine a simple case of radioactive 
waste  containment  has  shown  that,  depending  on  different  parameter  configurations, 
current and future generations may have convergent or divergent interests. In the first 
case mitigation efforts by the current generations will reduce both the short and the long 
term costs; in the second case, they will reduce the short term but increase the long term 
costs. There are also cases where the situation is initially unfavourable to both (optimal 
short term decision leading to increasing risks in both the short and ling term), but leads 
to a trap where future generations are immolated, using Huxley’s wording, on the altar of 
short term benefits. It is important to understand that this result allows for the role of 
increased knowledge and technological improvements, so that, in this special case, the 
outcome does indeed look like a trap. The best response in this case is to know what must 
be done beforehand in order to avoid falling into it.  
This  study  has  investigated  a  fundamental  question  in  a  very  simple  way, 
artificially neglecting an important aspect of the problem: uncertainty. The average long 
term productivity of capital, the efficiency of R&D mitigation efforts, and the extent of 
damages, should an event happen, are all uncertain and should be considered as random 
variables. The application of the basic idea, because it considers the interest rate as given, 
is limited to relatively small scale projects and excludes issues like climate change, which 
are macro-economic in scope.  As for the example treated, it is but a first step towards a 
more general treatment which would include a productive component. The appropriate 
example would be the construction of a nuclear plant producing highly radioactive waste 
during  its  lifetime.  A  further  step  would  be  to  include  the  possibility  of  irreversible 
losses, like the extinction of species or ecological communities, that science could not 
bring  back  to  life.  Even  with  this  last  complication,  provided  that  ex-ante  risks  of 
extinction are considered, the method proposed here should be of some help.  
 
                                                 
16 We need to remember that such ethical concerns come at the cost of a reduction in net benefits before T. 
Also, though not mentioned in this paper, the model used in this study shows it is sensible to consider two 
time  horizons,  TS  and  TL,  where  TL  represents  the  time  beyond  which  the  decision  maker  no  longer 
considers the effects of the current decision. In our case, TL could be for example 500 years. Once this 
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Appendix 1 : Categorising the different long term discounting possibilities 
   34 
Note that not discounting the long term (beyond T), or using a zero discount rate 
for it, is a particular case of the multiple rate case. One uses some positive rate before T 
and an (explicitly or implicitly) zero rate after T. A more rigorous categorisation of the 
multiple rate case should therefore be,  
- in the discrete form:  
￿  two or more decreasing discount rates, with the last one being zero; 
￿  two or more discount rates, with the last one being the lowest but remaining positive; 
- in the continuous form: 
￿  a continuously declining discount function, with the discount rate tending towards 
zero as time goes to infinity; 
￿  a continuously declining discount function, with the discount rate tending towards 
some strictly positive value as time goes to infinity. 
 From this perspective, the overall categorisation should comprise only two categories, 
namely: 
·  Use of a single positive discount rate (we ignore the case of a single zero discount rate 
for all time, as this runs counter to economic fundamentals); 
·  Use of a discretely or continuously declining sequence of rates, with the final rate 
being either positive or zero.  
However, because of the underlying theoretical justifications, discussed in the text, the 
initial categorisation into three cases remains the most practical, and we stick to it.  
 